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TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT--SECTION 2680(c) OF THE FTCA
BARS CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR NEGLIGENT
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY WHILE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE CUSTOMS SERVICE

Kosak v. United States (1982).
On February 28, 1978, pursuant to a search warrant, United States
Customs officials entered the home of Joseph Kosak and seized antiques and
works of art that they suspected Kosak had brought into the country ille2
gally.' Kosak was charged with smuggling goods into the United States
and was prosecuted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but was found not guilty. 3 On June 1, 1979, Customs
officials returned the seized items to Kosak in an allegedly damaged condition.4 Kosak filed suit for damages in the same district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),5 claiming that the negligence of the Customs
Service during the period of detention caused the alleged loss. 6 The district
court granted the government's motion to dismiss, 7 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8 affirmed, holding that the FTCA,
1. Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 722 (1983).
2. Id Kosak was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976). This section
provides criminal penalties for smuggling or "clandestinely introduc[ing] into the
United States any merchandise which should have been invoiced, or mak[ing] out or
pass[ing] or attempt[ing] to pass, through the custom-house any false, forged, or
fraudulent invoice, or other document or paper." Id
3. 679 F.2d at 307.
4. Id Kosak claimed that seventeen different items were damaged or destroyed
during detention, including: a nephrite jade incense burner worth $2,791, an antique
ivory Confucious worth $1,187, and an antique ivory tusk worth $1,209. Kosak
sought a total of $12,310 in damages. Brief for Appellant at 6, Kosak v. United
States, 679 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1982).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. 1980). The FTCA provides in pertinent part: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
related to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment
or for punitive damages." Id § 2674.
6. 679 F.2d at 307. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), which grants
the district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the FTCA. See 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
7. 679 F.2d at 307 n.2. The district court did not specify whether the motion
was granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)). This
failure by the district court did not preclude the Third Circuit from deciding the
issue presented because the court found that "no set of facts will support the plaintiff's claim." Id
8. The case was heard before Circuit Judges Aldisert, Weis, and Becker. Judge
Aldisert wrote the opinion for the majority, and Judge Weis wrote a dissenting
opinion.

(835)
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which bars claims "arising in respect of. . .the detention of any goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs," 9 precludes a claim against the
United States for negligent damage to property while in the custody of the
Customs Service. Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1982).
Traditionally, the government has been protected from suits in tort by
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 0 This doctrine, which
prohibits the assertion of an otherwise valid cause of action against the government, had its roots in the theory that "the King can do no wrong."' I The
government's immunity may be abrogated only if it consents to suit by way
of a legislative waiver of immunity 12 and such waivers of immunity are
strictly construed. 13 Historically, the only means of redress for tort claims
14
against the government was a system of private bills in Congress, whereby
an aggrieved party petitioned a member of Congress to introduce a bill
which would either directly compensate the claimant or open the doors of
the appropriate court to the claimant. 15 If a claimant was unsuccessful in
6
getting the bill passed, he was effectively left without a remedy.'
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976). This section provides that the government is not
liable under the FTCA for "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer." Id
10. For an overview of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, see
James, Tort Liabdi'y of Government Units and their Offtcers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610
(1955); Parker, The Ktng Does No Wrong--Liabi'ty for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L.
REV.

167 (1952).
11. See Parker, supra note 10. See also Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 348,

353 (1907) (no claim can be brought against the sovereign since "there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends");
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (no suit can be brought against the United
States without its consent).
12. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953). In Dalehite, the Court
stated that any inquiry into the amenability of the federal government to suit "starts
from the accepted jurisprudential principle that no action lies against the United
States unless the legislature has authorized it." Id.(footnote omitted). For a discussion of Dalehate, see notes 26-31 and accompanying text ifia.
13. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953). The Dalehite Court
stated that "decisions have interpreted the [waiver of immunity] to require clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity to give jurisdiction for tort actions." Id.
14. For a discussion of the private bill system, see S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 33 (1946). See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950) (noting
that the number of private bills introduced in Congress steadily increased as the functions of the federal government increased).
15. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946). This committee report, which accompanied the FTCA bill, explained that the private bill system
"either make[s] a direct appropriation for the payment of the claim or else remit[s]
the claimant to suit either in the Court of Claims or in a United States district court."
Id.For an overview of the development of governmental liability, see Borchard, Govemnment Liabilty in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); Borchard, Theories of
Government Responsibil'ty in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928).

16. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946). Congress observed
that this result was unjust "in that it does not accord to injured parties a recovery as a
matter of right but bases any award that may be made on considerations of grace."
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In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to abrogate, with certain limitations, 7 the federal government's immunity from
tort liability, and to establish the conditions for suits in tort against the government. 18 The FTCA eliminated the private bill system, 19 and made the
Id The Supreme Court also recognized that the system of private bills led to "capricious results," and concluded that "[t]he primary purpose of the [FTCA] was to extend a remedy to those who had been without." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
140 (1950).
17. Pub. L. No. 601, § 401, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 26712680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946). The
FTCA contains procedural limitations to the waiver of sovereign immunity. It requires a claimant to seek administrative relief as a prerequisite to instituting against
the government. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). This prerequisite is satisfied when the
federal agency makes a final disposition of the claim, or fails to make such a disposition within a six month period. Id The claim subsequently b'rought in federal court
may not request relief for an amount in excess of that sought by administrative remedies unless the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of the original claim. Id § 2675(b).
The FFCA also contains substantive limitations. The FTCA expressly excepts
several classes of claims from the waiver of immunity. Id § 2680. The waiver also
extends only to cases involving a loss caused by an employee of the government "acting within the scope of his office or employment" in situations in which "the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id. § 1346(b) (1976). There has
been some debate as to the proper construction of the "scope of employment" provision. See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 412 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1969) (government
employee driving to a house which he was considering purchasing pursuant to transfer by government employer was acting for his own benefit and not within the scope
of employment); United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. dismissed,
355 U.S. 801 (1957) (government employee may be acting within the scope of his
employment while undertaking a personal project if it is undertaken in the general
course of carrying out employer's business). See also Watkins v. United States, 462 F.
Supp. 980 (D. Ga. 1977), affd, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1979) (state law applies to
question of whether government employee is acting within the scope of employment).
18. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Proposed tort claims bills
were considered by Congress for nearly thirty years prior to passage of the FTCA. See
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953). For a brief discussion of the form
of these earlier bills and the problems they encountered in Congress, see S. REP. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946).
The immunity of the government had been waived in areas other than tort prior
to passage of the FTCA. Eg., Patent Infringement Act of 1910, 35 U.S.C. § 68
(1946) (repealed 1948); Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1976).
The government has been subject to suit in contract since the Court of Claims
Act of 1855, 10 Stat. 612 (amended 12 Stat. 765 (1863)). In 1887, the Tucker Act was
passed, giving United States district courts jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
Court of Claims for claims founded "upon any express or implied contract with the
United States" or for other claims "not sounding in tort." Tucker Act, ch. 359, 49
Stat. 505-08 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981)). The Tucker Act is strictly a jurisdictional statute vesting jurisdiction in the
federal courts to hear contract claims that exist against the government, and does not
create new substantive rights. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
It is well settled that only suits based on contracts implied in fact, rather than
those implied in law, are cognizable under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., Hatzlachh Supply v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 465 (1980); United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv.
Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926). An implied in fact contract is one which is "manifested by conduct." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-12
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government liable in tort "in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances."' 20 The FTCA's waiver of governmental immunity, however, is qualified by several express exceptions,2"
including the "customs exception" of section 2680(c) which bars claims
"arising in respect of... the detention of any goods or merchandise by any
officer of customs."

'22

(1977). State law prevails in claims based upon implied contracts. Hungate v.
United States, 627 F.2d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1980).
Some courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized recovery in cases
involving the detention of goods by the Customs Service based on an implied contract theory. See Hatzlachh Supply v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980); Alliance
Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958). These courts reasoned
that an implied bailment contract is created when goods are placed in the custody of
the Custom Service. The destruction or loss of those goods by customs agents constitutes a breach of the contract. See 444 U.S. at 465; 252 F.2d at 534.
In addition to conferring jurisdiction on the district courts and the Court of
Claims over contract suits against the government, the Tucker Act also gave those
courts jurisdiction over claims "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)
(1976) (amended 1978). See Lee v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. S. REp. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946). Abolishment of the private bill system was apparently a major motivation in the passage of the FTCA. See
i. The legislative history of the FTCA is replete with references to the burden which
the private bill system placed on Congress. See, e.g., S. REP, No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 30-31 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). For the pertinent provisions of § 2674, see note 5
supra. There is some conflict as to whether the effect of this waiver of immunity
creates new rights of action, or whether it is strictly limited to situations in which a
cause of action is available against a private person. The majority of courts have
held that the FTCA "did not create new causes of action where none existed before,
nor did it foist novel and unprecedented liabilities upon the federal government."
Builders Corp. of Am. v. United States, 320 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 906 (1964). See also National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 277
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 967 (1954); Reed v. Hadden, 473 F. Supp. 658, 659-60
(D. Colo. 1979); Sawyer v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 282, 285 (E.D. Va. 1978).
However, in the same year as the Ninth Circuit's Builder's Corp. decision, the
Supreme Court noted in dictum that "[t]he Act extends to novel and unprecedented
forms of liability as well." United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963).
This conflict seems to arise primarily in situations in which the allegedly tortious
act is one in which private persons or corporations do not generally engage. For
example, the Supreme Court was faced with a claim under the FTCA based on the
allegedly negligent operation of a lighthouse by the government. See Indiana Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 62 (1955). The government urged the Court to
read § 2674 to exclude liability for negligence in the performance of activities which
private persons do not perform. Id at 64. The Court rejected this reasoning as being
"self-defeating" to the FTCA. Id. at 65-69.
21. For the express exceptions to the FTCA's waiver of immunity, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (1976).
22. Id § 2680(c) (1976). The term "customs exception" is used herein for purposes of identification only, the exception not being limited to employees of the Cus-

toms Service, but also extending to the detention of goods by "any other law
enforcement officer." Id See A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d
849 (9th Cir. 1978) (customs exception issue involved detention of goods by officers of
the United States Secret Service); notes 42-46 and accompanying text nfra. See also
S. Schonfeld Co. v. SS Akra Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.C. 1973) (applying the
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23
The legislative history of the customs exception to the FTCA is sparse,
and does not expressly address the question of its applicability to suits for
negligence occurring during the detention of goods. 24 However, the committee report which accompanied the bill states that the express exceptions encompass "claims which relate to certain governmental activities which
should be free from the threat of damage suit, or for which adequate reme'2 5
dies are already available."

In Dalehte v. United States 26 the Supreme Court engaged in an over-all
interpretation of the FTCA and its exceptions, although without expressly
addressing the customs exception. 27 Acknowledging that "no action lies
against the United States unless the legislature has authorized it," 28 the
Court recognized that the exceptions to that waiver must be given their "due
regard."'2 9 The Court interpreted the scheme of the FTCA to require the
customs exception in case involving detention of goods by officers of the Food and
Drug Administration); notes 56-60 and accompanying text 1nfra.
23. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946). the entire treatment of
the "exceptions" portion of the FTCA constituted one brief paragraph in the committee report which accompanied the bill which basically restates the statute's enumerated exceptions. Id The customs exception specifically is treated simply by
rewording its provisions to read "these exceptions cover claims arising out of... the
detention of goods by customs officers." Id
24. See id.
25. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946). For a discussion of the
suggested relevance of this language to suits for negligent damage to property during
detention, see notes 94-100 and accompanying text thfra.
26. 346 U.S. 15 (1953), ajg, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1951). Dalehite involved a
wrongful death action brought under the FTCA for the death of Henry G. Dalehite
caused by the explosion of a government-produced supply of aluminum nitrate based
fertilizer. 346 U.S. at 17. The claim alleged that the government was negligent in
adopting the fertilizer program as a whole, in the control of the program, and in the
failure to warn of the dangerous nature of the fertilizer. 197 F.2d at 773. The district
court originally granted relief, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. at 781. On grant of
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding
that the claim was barred by § 2680(a) of the FTCA, which excludes from the waiver
of the FTCA "any claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure
to perform a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be
abused." 346 U.S. at 35-37. For the Court's interpretation of § 2680(a), see note 27

inira.
27. 346 U.S. at 30-36. The Court provided a detailed analysis of § 2680(a) of
the FTCA, and concluded that the conduct of the government attacked in the suit
fell within the discretionary functions of the government. Id. at 37-42. The Court
noted that the acts of subordinate government employees in carrying out discretionary decisions of governmental officials were also exempt under § 2680(a). Id at 36.
28. 346 U.S. at 30. See also Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S.
666 (1977); United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976); Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500 (1940).
For a general discussion of the scope and history of the FTCA, see notes 17-22 and
accompanying text supra.
29. 346 U.S. at 31. The Court stated that the role of a court in applying the
FTCA as a whole was to give the statute a reading which "carr[ies] out the legislative
purpose of allowing suits against the Government for negligence with due regard for
the statutory exceptions to that policy." Id.
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"clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity" in order for a claim to lie
against the United States, 30 and stated that Congress never intended to re31
linquish immunity to claims that "affected the governmental functions.
Among the courts that have addressed the customs exception specifically, there is a conflict as to whether that exception was intended to exclude
from the waiver of immunity claims based on damage to property during
detention due to the negligence of Customs employees, or whether that exception was only intended to encompass claims based on damage from the
fact of the detention itself.3 2 In Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 33 the
Second Circuit was faced with a claim that a shipment of imported goods
mysteriously disappeared while being detained by the Customs Service for
routine inspection and valuation.3 4 The insurer subrogee brought suit under
the FTCA to recover the value of the lost goods. 35 The Second Circuit held
36
that the district court had jurisdiction over the claim under the FTCA,
30. Id The Supreme Court has expressed the rule requiring clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity on other occasions. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950). In Feres, three members of the armed forces were injured while on
active duty, by the alleged negligence of others in the armed forces. Id. at 136-37.
The Court reasoned that since a system of compensation for those injured in the
armed forces already existed in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 501 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the FTCA was not intended as a waiver for those
claims. Id. at 145-46. See also United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949)
(§ 2680(c) of the FTCA barred a claim against the United States for injuries incurred
while plaintiff was on a United States military base over which the sovereignty of the
United States did not extend).
31. 346 U.S. at 32. See also S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946)
(exceptions section includes "claims which relate to certain governmental functions
which should be free from the threat of damage suit, or for which adequate remedies
are already available.")
32. For a summary of the split among the courts on the scope of section 2680(c)
at the time Kosak was decided, see 679 F.2d at 307-08 n.3. See also notes 33-60 and
accompanying text infra.
33. 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
34. Id.at 531. The imported goods consisted of English woolens with a stipulated value of $2,460.59. Id A duty of $708.25 was paid upon entry, and the goods
were transferred to public stores for inspection by Customs officials pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1499 (1976), to ascertain if the goods were in fact of the quantity and value
declared by importer upon entry. 252 F.2d at 531.
The woolens disappeared from the public stores where they had been consigned.
Id. The district court found that the manner in which the goods disappeared "remains a mystery." Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 118, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
35. 252 F.2d at 531. A cause of action was also claimed under the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) for breach of an implied bailment
contract. Id For a discussion of the possibility of a Tucker Act remedy, see note 18
supra. The Second Circuit also reversed the district court's decision that there was no
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. The court held that the government impliedly
promised to use "due care during the term of bailment" thus creating an implied-infact bailment contract. 252 F.2d at 532-33. For cases which distinguish implied-inlaw and implied-in-fact contracts, see Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1939); United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926).
36. 252 F.2d at 533. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to prove
negligence and entered judgment for the government. 146 F. Supp. at 123-24. The
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and that the claim was not barred by the customs exception. 3 7 The Alliance
court reasoned that the probable purpose of the customs exception was to
"prohibit actions for conversion arising from a denial by the customs authorities . . . of another's immediate right of dominion or control over goods"
during detention. 38 In support of its position that the customs exception was
not intended to bar claims based on negligence, but only those based on
conversion, the court stressed that the language of the immediately preceding exception 39 expressly bars actions "arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or
negligent transmission" of mail. 40 Had Congress intended to bar negligence
suits against the Customs Service in situations such as this, the Alhance court
reasoned, it would have done so expressly, as it had done with the postal
4
exception. 1
The Alliance court's reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service.4 2 In A-Mark, the plaintiff
brought suit claiming that a rare silver coin was damaged during detention
by the United States Secret Service. 43 The district court dismissed the plaindistrict court held that the customs exception to the FTCA did not bar the claim,
reasoning that the Customs Service "could not detain goods which had disappeared."
Id at 122. The Second Circuit agreed with this reasoning "in theory." 252 F.2d at
534.
37. 252 F.2d at 533-34. The court reversed the finding of the district court that
plaintiff had failed to prove the negligence of the government. Id at 534-36. The
court found that the government was a bailee of the goods and that, once loss was
established, there arose a presumption of negligence against the bailee. Id at 534.
The bailee, according to the court, bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the loss was caused by an event beyond its control. Id. at 536. The
Second Circuit concluded that the government's inability to explain the disappearance did not satisfy this burden, Id
38. Id at 534. Judge Moore, writing for the court, stated that the customs exception to the FTCA was "normally used to bar actions based upon the illegal seizure
of goods." Id (citing Jones v. FBI, 139 F. Supp. 38 (D. Md. 1956); United States v.
One 1951 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 125 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Mo. 1954)).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1976) (excluding from the waiver of immunity
claims "arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of the mail).
40. 252 F.2d at 534 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1976)). Judge Moore stated
that the express mention of negligence in § 2680(b) was the "best evidence" in support of his conclusion that § 2680(c) was not intended to encompass negligence
claims. Id
41. Id. The court referred to the postal exception in § 2680(b) as a "general
absolution from carelessness in handling property belonging to others." Id. Because
of the absence of any reference to negligence in § 2680(c), the court stated that the
"conclusion is inescapable" that Congress intended no such general immunity to apply to the Customs Service. Id
42. 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), rev'g, 428 F. Supp. 138 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
43. 593 F.2d at 849. On April 14, 1976, the president of A-Mark, Inc. submitted
a coin to the Secret Service for authentication. At that time the coin was numismatically graded as "Brilliant, Uncirculated, and Semi-Proof Like." Id The Secret Service transferred the coin to the Office of the Bureau of the Mint which, in August,
1971, opined that the coin was genuine but that the mint mark had been altered. Id
at 850. The Secret Service then detained the coin pending investigation into possible
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 331 (1976) (mutilation, diminution, and falsification of
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tiff's complaint under the customs exception of the FTCA,44 but the Ninth
Circuit reversed, 45 adopting the language and reasoning of the Alhance court
that the exception bars "only those claims asserting injury as a result of the
' 46
fact of detention itself."
Recently, the Fifth Circuit also adopted the Alliance court's interpretation of the FTCA in A & D International,Inc. v. United States, 47 where gems
were lost while purportedly locked in a Customs Service safe. 48 The Fifth
coins) and 18 U.S.C. § 492 (1976) (forfeiture of counterfeit paraphernalia). 428 F.
Supp. 138, 139.
Upon request by the plaintiff, the coin was examined by an independent examiner on January 31, 1972, who declared the coin and the mint mark to be genuine.
Id at 139. At the time of this examination the coin was undamaged. Id.Thereafter
the coin was again examined by the Bureau of the Mint, again found to be altered,
and again detained by the Secret Service. Id. The coin was later returned to the
plaintiff with notice that any attempt by him to sell or transfer the coin without full
disclosure would be deemed fraudulent. d The plaintiff alleged that the coin was
in damaged condition when returned to him. Id at 138.
44. 593 F.2d at 849. The customs exception to the FTCA is applicable to claims
against the United States Secret Service by virtue of the "any other law enforcement
officer" language of the section. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976). For a discussion of
the use of the term "customs exception," see note 22 supra.
The district court dismissed the claim against the government on the ground
that damage could only have occurred during the period of detention, and therefore
§ 2680(c) precluded the claim. 428 F. Supp. at 140. The district court disagreed
with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Alliance v. UnitedStates , stating that the Alliance
decision was "not in accord with the terms of [§ 2680(c)]." Id
45. 593 F.2d at 850. Judge Tang concurred in the result, but stated that a better analysis of the case was that § 2680(c) did not apply to the case at bar since the
coin was not being detained within the context of customs or tax activities. Id
(Tang, J., concurring). Judge Tang reasoned that the "any other law enforcement
officer" language of § 2680(c) should be read to include only officers detaining goods
for customs or tax purposes. Id.at 851 (Tang, J., concurring).
46. Id at 850. The Ninth Circuit quoted theAllance opinion in its entirety with
respect to the purpose and scope of § 2680(c). Id.The court also adopted verbatim
the Alliance court's treatment of the § 2680(b) postal exception. Id For a discussion
of the Alliance opinion, see notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
47. 665 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1982). But see United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood,
19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974). In Custom Boat, a claim was
made against the United States under the FTCA by the owner of a boat which had
been used by the boat's lessee to transport marijuana. Id. at 1329. The boat was
seized from the lessee by Customs officials, who agreed to return the boat to the
innocent owner upon the payment of a $400 storage charge. Id. The owner refused
to pay, and the government instituted forfeiture proceedings. Id The owner then
counterclaimed under the FTCA for damage to the boat and loss of service during
detention. Id at 1330. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the counterclaim, on
the ground that § 2680 specifically prohibits the bringing of any claim arising from
the detention of any goods or merchandise by a customs officer. Id
In A & D International, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Custom Boat by stressing
that in the earlier case the plaintiff was "challenging the propriety of the storage
charge as applied to him, an innocent party." 665 F.2d at 673. However, since the
claim in Custom Boat also sought redress for "damage to the boat" during detention,
this distinction is somewhat unclear. See 501 F.2d at 1330.
48. 665 F.2d at 670-71.
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Circuit held that jurisdiction was proper under the FTCA, 49 finding the Alli50
ance rationale with respect to the customs exception to be "persuasive."
In contrast to the Alliance approach, the Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircrafl,5 found that the FTCA did not provide a
remedy for damage that occurred to an airplane while it was held by customs officials. 52 While the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly state that the
customs exception precluded the plaintiff's claim, 53 both the precedent re49. Id at 672. The issue of jurisdiction under the FTCA was not challenged at
the district court level. Id Rather, judgment for the government was based on
plaintiff's failure to meet his burden of proving that negligence of the government
was the proximate cause of the loss. Id It was only on the appellate level that the
United States asserted the defense of lack of a claim under the FTCA based upon
§ 2680(c). Id
50. Id. On the district court level, both parties argued their case on a theory of

an implied-in-fact contract of bailment. Id at 673. The district court judge, however, decided the case utilizing a tort analysis, finding no negligence on the part of
the government. Id In a section of the opinion headed "A Case of Negligent Tort or
Contract Bailment-A Distinction Without a Difference?" the Fifth Circuit stressed
that since the "[p]laintiff did not prove the existence of a bailment and negligence
analysis fits comfortably within the [FTCA] and provides a proper disposition of this
case" it was not necessary on appeal to decide whether the claim was properly
brought under the FTCA rather than the Tucker Act. Id.at 674. For a discussion of
the Tucker Act remedy, see note 18 supra.
51. 662 F.2d 1372 (1lth Cir. 1981). In Douglas, the appellant's aircraft was
seized and detained for a lengthy period by Customs officials. The owner obtained a
court order compelling the government to either institute forfeiture proceedings or
release the aircraft. Id at 1373-74. The aircraft was returned, but in a damaged
condition. Id at 1373. Relief was sought in the form of a post-judgment remedy for
a writ of assistance pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 70 (Judgment for Specific Acts) and
for relief from or modification of the judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
(Relief from Judgment or Order). Id at 1373-74. The owner sought to have the
order compelling return of the aircraft amended to read that it be returned "in an
airworthy condition." Id.at 1373. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of relief under FED. R. Civ. P. 70 on the grounds that that rule was intended
to apply only to cases in which the parties did not "comply with orders to perform
specific acts." Id at 1374 (quoting 12 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 302 (1973)). Since the appellant did not claim noncompliance
with the order, both courts found Rule 70 to be inapplicable. Id.The district court
denied the petition under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which provides relief from a final
judgment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation, on the grounds that appellant
did not meet the burden of proving fraud "by clear and convincing evidence." Id
The Eleventh Circuit stated that it was not required to resolve the issue of fraud or
misrepresentation since claims for affirmative relief beyond the reopening of a judgment must be asserted in a new and independent suit and the issue was thus beyond
the scope of Rule 60(b). Id at 1377 (citing United States v. One 1967 Red Chevrolet
Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353, 1356 (5th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. United States, 266 F.2d
657, 659 (5th Cir. 1959)).
52. Id at 1376. The Eleventh Circuit seemed to follow a prior decision of the
Fifth Circuit. Id See United States v. One (1) Wood 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F.2d
1327 (5th Cir. 1974). Custom Boat held that § 2680(c) barred recovery under the
FTCA for damage to property during detention due to the negligence of Customs
employees, but recognized the availability of a remedy under the Tucker Act. See id.
at 1330. For a discussion of Custom Boat, see note 47 supra.
53. See 662 F.2d at 1376. The court held that the plaintiff had to proceed under
the Tucker Act to recover. The court did not expressly state its grounds for holding
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lied upon by the court 54 and the result reached strongly imply that it consid55
ered the customs exception to preclude the claim.
The view that the customs exception to the FTCA bars claims for negligent damage to property which occurs during detention was clearly adopted
by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in S.
Schonfeld Co., Inc. v. SS Akra Tenaron .56 In Schonfeld, the plaintiff claimed that

its imported cargo was damaged by the negligent handling of employees of
the Pure Food and Drug Administration during detention. 57 Dismissing the
negligence claim against the government, the district court expressly rejected
the Alliance approach stating that "there is nothing in the language of the
statute to indicate that erroneous seizure in the inception should be distinguished from improper retention or negligent handling of goods properly
seized at the outset."'58 The court found the Alliance court's distinction between actions for conversion and actions for negligence 59 to be "artificial"
since the FTCA "specifically bars 'any claim' arising out of the detention of
that the claim should have been brought under the Tucker Act. Id

Though the

court clearly relied on Custom Boat, it is not clear whether it relied on Custom Boat's
interpretation of § 2680(c), or whether it relied on the facts of the case at bar being so
closely related to those in Custom Boat as to clearly place the claim under the Tucker
Act. Id. For a discussion of the facts of Custom Boat, and the Fifth Circuit's application of § 2680(c) in that case, see note 47 supra.
54. 662 F.2d at 1376. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Custom Boat, see notes 52-53 supra. For a discussion of the
facts of Custom Boat, see note 47 supra.
55. See 662 F.2d at 1338. In affirming the district court's dismissal of the motions under FED. R. Civ. P. 70 & 60(b), the court of appeals reached the same result
as if it had expressly stated that the claim was barred by § 2680(c) of the FTCA. See
note 51 supra.
56. 363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.C. 1973).
57. Id at 1220-21. The imported cargo consisted of 2700 cartons of canned tomatoes imported from Spain. Id.at 1220. The tomatoes were inspected by agents of
the Pure Food and Drug Administration (FDA) upon entry at Charleston, South
Carolina, at which time a portion of the shipment was found to be damaged and
unfit for consumption. Id The plaintiff alleged that through the negligent segregation of the shipment by the FDA, the entire cargo was destroyed rather than only
that portion originally found to be damaged. Id at 1221.
58. Id.at 1223. The government based its motion to dismiss on two exceptions
to the FTCA-§ 2680(a) and § 2680(c). Id at 1221. Section 2680(a) provides in
pertinent part that the FTCA does not apply to claims based upon the exercise of "a
discretionary function ..., whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976)). The court held that § 2680(a) did not bar the
claim since the conduct complained of occurred after the government had exercised
its discretion and had proceeded to act on the matter. Id The court found, however,
that the claim was barred by § 2680(c). Id.at 1223.
59. Id For a discussion of the distinction drawn by the Second Circuit in Atliance between actions for conversion and those for negligence, see notes 38-41 and
accompanying text supra.
The Schonfeld court stressed that there was no practical difference between claims
arising from the fact of detention and those arising from negligence, since the detained goods would be "equally unavailable to a claimant if they are padlocked in a
customs house, or if they are physically destroyed." 363 F. Supp. at 1223.
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goods."60

Although in Hatzlachh Supply v. Uni'led Slates, 6 ' the United States
Supreme Court recognized the split among jurisdictions as to the correct
62
interpretation of the customs exception, the Court did not resolve the issue.
The Hatzlachh Court found a valid claim under the Tucker Act on an implied contract theory and held that the customs exception could not be used
as a bar to claims brought solely under the Tucker Act, 63 and therefore
64
found it to be unnecessary to determine the scope of the exception.
Against this background, the Third Circuit began its discussion of governmental liability for negligent damage to goods in the possession of the
60. 363 F. Supp. at 1223. The Schonfeld court was emphatic in its rejection of
Alliance, which it termed "an anomaly." Id The focus of the court was on the "end
result" to a claimant from the loss of property due to seizure by Customs officials,
and it saw no difference in the results of "loss from the fact of detention" and "loss
from negligence during detention." Id.
61. 444 U.S. 460 (1980) (per curiam). In Hatzlachh, the petitioner's imported
camera supplies were seized and detained by the Customs Service. Id at 461. When
the goods were eventually returned to the petitioner he claimed that merchandise
valued at $165,000 was missing, and brought suit under the Tucker Act for breach of
an implied contract of bailment. Id For a discussion of the Tucker Act, see note 18
supra. The Court of Claims granted the government's motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that since § 2680(c) of the FTCA barred the claim in tort, the
claimant should not be permitted to get around that bar by phrasing the claim as one
sounding in contract. 444 U.S. at 462.
62. 444 U.S. at 462-63 n.3. The Supreme Court summarized the split among
the jurisdictions, as it existed at that time, as follows:
A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service and Alliance Assurance Co. v. United
States, it is said, permit recovery under the Tort Claims Act for the loss of
goods detained by customs officers; whereas this case, UnitedStates v. One (1)
1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, and S Schonfeld o. S S Akan Tenaron construe
§ 2680(c) to except such losses from the Tort Claims Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court read the Fifth Circuit's Custom Boat opinion to construe
§ 2680(c) as a bar to claims for negligent loss of property, while the Fifth Circuit itself
later read that case differently in A & D International. See 665 F.2d at 672 n.2, 673.
For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's characterization of its opinions in Custom Boat
and A & D International, see note 47 supra.
63. 444 U.S. at 462-63. The Court held that § 2680(c) did not "limit or otherwise affect immunity waivers contained in . . . the Tucker Act." Id. at 463. The
Court stated that "neither the existence of a tort remedy nor the lack of one is relevant to determining whether there is a [cause of action under] the Tucker Act." Id.
at 466.
64. Id at 462-63 n.3. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion which focused
on the distinction between implied-in-law contracts and implied-in-fact contracts.
Id. at 466-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that the waiver of
immunity in the Tucker Act extends only to those contracts implied in fact. Id. at
467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He saw the contract in Hatzlachh as one implied in
law, and therefore, outside the scope of the Tucker Act. Therefore, according to
Judge Blackmun, the Court of Claims did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim. Id For other cases which draw a distinction between implied-in-law and
implied-in-fact contracts, see United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S.
212, 217 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1925); Sutton v.
United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581 (1920); Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 129
(1918).
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Customs Service. 65 The Third Circuit acknowledged the divergence among
federal courts on the Kosak issue, stating that the conflict stems from the
phrase "arising from the detention of goods" in section 2680(c). 66 Noting
that the Second Circuit in Alh'ance found the statutory language to bar only
actions for conversion and not actions for negligence, 67 the Third Circuit
rejected this construction and disagreed with the Alance court's dependence
upon the fact that the immediately preceding exception in the FTCA expressly includes negligent conduct. 68 The Third Circuit, in Kosak, found
that the Alliance court's reasoning was defective in that it ignored the clear
language69 and legislative intent behind 70 the statute and ignored the direction of the Supreme Court to strictly interpret statutory exceptions to sover71
eign immunity.
The Third Circuit maintained that the clear language of the section
"covers all claims arising out of detention of goods by customs officers and
' ' 72
does not purport to distinguish among types of harm.
The court then turned to the legislative history of section 2680(c) and
found that it revealed "no clearly expressed legislative intention contrary" to
the statutory language. 73 Observing that the legislative history provides
only a "brief statement" referring to the FTCA exceptions, 74 the court found
nothing in the legislative materials to support an interpretation that the "ex65. 679 F.2d at 308. Because the Third Circuit had not previously addressed
the issue at bar, appellant invited the court to adopt the interpretation of § 2680(c)
enunciated by the Second Circuit in Alliance which allowed the claim under the
FTCA. Id at 307. For a discussion of the Aliance opinion, see notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
66. 679 F.2d at 307-08. For the text of § 2680(c), see note 9 supra.
67. 679 F.2d at 308. The Third Circuit stated that in reaching its decision the
Alliance court had "speculated" as to the scope of § 2680(c). Id.
68. Id.The Third Circuit expressly rejected the reasoning adopted by the Allhance court that if Congress had intended § 2680(c) to include negligence actions it
would have expressly provided so, as it had done in § 2680(b). Id
69. Id.at 308. For the language of § 2680(c), see note 9 supra.
70. 679 F.2d at 308. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 2680(c), see
notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
71. 679 F.2d at 308 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S.Ct. 1534,
1537 (1982)) (footnote omitted).
As did the Supreme Court in Hatzlachh, the Third Circuit characterized the
Fifth Circuit's Custom Boat opinion as being in conflict with Alliance. Id. For the
Supreme Court's summary of the split of authority on the scope of § 2680(c), see note
62 supra.

The Third Circuit stated that the Fifth Circuit's distinction of Custom Boat and A
&D International "appears to us to be based upon a misreading of the earlier case."
679 F.2d at 307 n.3. For a discussion of these decisions, see note 47 and accompanying text supra.
72. 679 F.2d at 308.
73. Id.For a discussion of the legislative history of § 2680(c), see notes 23-25 and
accompanying text supra.
74. 679 F.2d at 308. The court stated that the section-by-section analysis of the
FTCA contained in the committee report which accompanied the FTCA bill in Congress provides only that the exceptions were meant to include certain governmental
functions which should be free from the threat of suit, or those functions for which a
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emption was to be restricted to claims in conversion." ' 75
Noting that "sovereign immunity is the rule, and that legislative departures from the rule must be strictly construed, ' 76 the court maintained that
absent a clear relinquishment of immunity in any given case, the "rule" of
immunity must apply. 7 7 The language of section 2680(c) which barred "any
claim arising in respect of. . .the detention of any goods or merchandise by
any officer of customs" ' 78 did not, in the Third Circuit's view, clearly relin-

quish immunity to negligence suits in the context of customs detentions.7 9
The Third Circuit concluded that since the suit arose from the detention of
goods by Customs officials, it was barred regardless of whether it arose in
negligence or conversion. 80
Dissenting from the opinion of the court, Judge Weis expressed the view
that the majority decision results in an anomaly which Congress did not
intend. 8 ' The dissent observed that under the majority's view, a traveler
whose property was damaged by Customs officers during inspection at a port
of entry would have a cause of action under the FTCA, while the same traveler would be without a remedy if the property were damaged during detention. 82 Conceding that a strict construction of the FTCA's waiver of
immunity is required, Judge Weis argued that exceptions to the general
remedy is already available to an injured party. Id (citing S. REP. No. 1400, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946)).
75. Id at 308.
76. Id.at 308-09 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)).
77. 679 F.2d at 309 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. at 31).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976). For pertinent provisions of § 2680(c), see note 9
supra.

79. 679 F.2d at 309 (citing Builders Corp. of Am. v. United States, 320 F.2d 425
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964)). Builders Corp. involved a suit against
the government for losses incurred by the plaintiff in relation to a project to build
housing for the military. 320 F.2d at 426 n.2. The government asserted that the
claim was barred by § 2680(a) of the FTCA since the challenged conduct was discretionary in nature. Id at 428 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. at 35-36).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the government, stating
that "the exceptions to the FTCA are not to be nullified through judicial interpretation, since Congress clearly delineated the areas in which it did not intend to forfeit
its immunity from suit." Id.at 426.
80. 679 F.2d at 309. The court's reference here to conversion was clearly an
allusion to the Second Circuit's analysis in Alliance. For a discussion of the Second
Circuit's analysis in Alhance, see notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
81. 679 F.2d at 309 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis stated that Congress did
not intend to give the Customs Service "a license to harm property while it is being
detained." Id
82. Id Judge Weis stated that the plaintiff in Kosak had the right to expect that
either his property would be returned by the government, or that he would be paid
damages. Id
The dissent commented that the FTCA was a response to the "injustice" which
sovereign immunity had worked on citizens injured in person or property by negligent government employees. Id The dissent continued that, even under a narrow
construction, the claim in Kosak was "plainly the type that Congress intended the
government to recompense." Id Judge Weis likened the structure of the FTCA's
general waiver followed by specific exceptions to that of an insurance policy "which
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waiver should be limited to their terms. 83 He drew a sharp distinction between the statutory language "in respect of" and the terms "arising out of"
or "during."'8 4 The dissenting judge stated that the statutory language was
not broad enough to encompass claims for damage occurring "during" detention, but rather that it only encompassed claims arising from the fact of
detention. 85 He also agreed with the Alhance court's observation that had
Congress intended to bar claims based on the negligence of Customs officials,
8 6
it would have done so expressly, as it did in the preceding postal exception.
Judge Weis also noted with approval the Ninth Circuit's decision in AMarkN8 7 and criticized the decisions holding that section 2680(c) bars claims
for negligence as analyzing neither the "language [n]or policy of [the section]
88
before coming to their conclusions."
Reviewing the opinion of the court, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's holding in Kosak effectuates a reasonable interpretation of section
2680(c). 8 9 It is submitted, however, that the statutory language is in fact
ambiguous, and that the court therefore placed far too much emphasis on
initially grants coverage in broad terms and then refines it by a series of exclusions."
Id.
83. Id Judge Weis stated that the purpose of strictly construing the FTCA's
waiver "is served once the outer limits of the government's liability are demarcated."
Id. at 309-10 (Weis, J., dissenting). Once the "outer limits" are defined, Judge Weis
believed that the specific exceptions to the waiver should be "limited to their terms"
and construed narrowly in favor of the injured citizen. Id at 310 (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
84. Id. Judge Weis apparently drew this semantic distinction in response to the
district court's misquote of§ 2680(c) in Schonfeld. See id. (quoting S. Schonfeld Co. v.
SS Akra Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (D.S.C. 1973)). In Schonfeld, the court
referred to § 2680(c) as excluding any claims "arising out of" the detention of goods
by Customs officials. 363 F. Supp. at 1223. Judge Weis stated that the difference
between the language used by the court in Schonfeld and the term "arising in respect
of" which appears in section 2680(c) was a "subtle but nevertheless significant distinction." 679 F.2d at 310 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Schonfeld, see
notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
85. 679 F.2d at 310 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis cited the dictionary definition of "in respect of" to support his semantic argument. Id That term is defined
as "as to: as regards: insofar as concerns: with respect to." "d (quoting WEBSTER'S
THIRD INTERNATIONAL NEW DICTIONARY 1934 (1968)).
86. Id. The dissent stated that the government could detain the plaintiff's property under the Customs statutes "without liability for damages which might be
caused by the denial of possession," but that the government had to compensate "the
harm it did to the property while it was being detained." Id.
87. Id. (citing A-Mark, Inc. v. United States, 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978)). For
a discussion of the A-Mark decision, see notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
88. 679 F.2d at 310 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis found it noteworthy that
although the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of the scope of § 2680(c) in
Hatzlachh v. UntiedStates, the Court did reverse the decision of the Court of Claims
which relied in part upon an expansive interpretation of § 2680(c) in line with that
adopted by the majority in Kosak. Id For a discussion of Hatzlachh, see notes 61-64
and accompanying text supra.
89. For the relevant language of § 2680(c), see note 9 supra. For a discussion of
the Third Circuit's opinion, see notes 65-80 and accompanying text supra.
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the "clear language" of the statute. 9° It is clear however, that the court was
correct in finding no guidance in the legislative history of the FTCA in interpreting the language of section 2680(c). 9 1 Because the language is ambiguous and the legislature silent as to the scope of the language, it is suggested
that the court in Kosak was free to adopt its own interpretation of the section
within the established rules of statutory construction, 9 2 and that its interpre93
tation was well within the bounds of reasonableness.
While the legislative history of section 2680(c) does not aid in clarifying
the language of the section, it does provide some affirmative support for the
result reached by the Third Circuit in Kosak, and the Kosak court missed the
opportunity to strengthen its holding by ignoring it. 94 The committee report
which accompanied the Tort Claims bill in Congress stated that the exceptions to the FTCA's waiver were intended to include claims "for which adequate remedies [were] already available." 95 It is suggested that since the
90. For a discussion of the court's reliance on the "clear language" of § 2680(c),
see note 72 and accompanying text supra. In dissent, Judge Weis was equally convinced that the statutory language was clear. See 679 F.2d at 309-310 (Weis, J., dissenting). However, Judge Weis determined that the language did not encompass
negligence during detention. Id.at 310 (Weis, J., dissenting).
91. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of § 2680(c), see notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
The legislative history of § 2680(c) merely restates the statutory language, without commenting on the scope of that language. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 33 (1946).
92. For a discussion of the established rules of statutory construction concerning
the FTCA, see notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court has
stated that the FTCA must clearly relinquish immunity for an action to lie against
the government, and that the exceptions to the waiver of immunity must be given
their "due regard." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953).
93. It is submitted that the Third Circuit was overly critical of the Second Circuit's decision in Alliance. See 679 F.2d at 308. Since the Second Circuit was aided in
interpreting the statute only to the extent to which the Kosak court was, it is suggested that the Second Circuit violated neither the clear language nor the legislative
history of the statute, as the Kosak court claimed. See id It is submitted that the
Alhance court construed § 2680(c) in a manner which was also within the bounds of
reasonableness. For a discussion of Alhance, see notes 33-41 and accompanying text
supra.

94. See 679 F.2d at 308. It is suggested that the Third Circuit's analysis of the
legislative history proceeded upon the assumption that the statutory language was
unambiguous. See id It is submitted that the court was correct in finding no "clearly
expressed legislative intention" of any kind. Id. However, it is submitted that the
assumption from which the court began its analysis of the legislative history was erroneous, and that the legislative search was therefore meaningless. Since the court considered the statutory language unambiguous, it was looking for "clearly expressed
legislative intention" contrary to "the ordinary meaning of the words used [in the
statute]." Id.Because of the sparcity of the legislative history of § 2680(c), there was
no chance of the court finding such a clear expression of legislative intention. It is
submitted that the court would have made a more meaningful legislative search had
it proceeded from the assumption that the statutory language was in fact ambiguous,
thereby looking for more subtle indications of legislative intention than those "clearly
expressed." For a discussion of the Third Circuit's use of the legislative history of
Section 2680(c), see notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
95. S.REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946). The legislative history
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Tucker Act 96 pre-dated the FTCA, 97 it is possible that Congress considered
the type of claim presented in Kosak as one which was already afforded an
adequate remedy and thus was intended to be excluded from the general
waiver. 98 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Hiatzachh Supply v. U'led States,
ultimately recognized a remedy for damage to property during detention by
Customs officials under the Tucker Act, albeit not until long after the passage of the FTCA. 99 It is suggested that the Third Circuit could have used
this analysis to strengthen its decision.100
Until the Supreme Court resolves the dispute as to the scope of section
2680(c) of the FTCA, the courts of appeals will surely remain divided. In
resolving the issue, it is suggested that the Supreme Court acknowledge the
ambiguity of the statute and decide the issue on the basis of a balance of the
interests involved, 0 1 the rules that it has established concerning construction of the FTCA, and the availability of an existing remedy, rather than on
the basis of an imparted "clear meaning" of ambiguous language.
Dant'eid O'Brien
indicates that in enacting the FTCA, Congress was seeking a "uniform system" for
the resolution of tort claims against the government. Id at 31. Since the Supreme
Court in Hatzlachh v. United States recognized a claim under the Tucker Act for suits
arising from the same facts as those in Kosak, it is submitted that the uniformity
desired by Congress would be better achieved through the Third Circuit's interpretation of § 2680(c).
For further discussion of the legislative history of § 2680(c), see notes 23-25 and
accompanying text supra.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the possibility of a Tucker Act remedy, see notes 18 & 63 supra.
97. Compare Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 601, § 401, 60 Stat. 842 (enacted 1946) with Tucker Act, ch. 359, 49 Stat. 505 (enacted 1887).
98. In its analysis of the legislative materials on § 2680(c), the Third Circuit
acknowledged this passage from the committee report, but it did not connect it with
the possibility of an available remedy under the Tucker Act. See 679 F.2d at 308
(quoting S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 33). It is suggested that the failure
of the Third Circuit to make the proposed analysis possibly stems from its initial
erroneous conclusion that the statutory language was unambiguous. Had the court
proceeded in its legislative search looking for other than "clearly expressed legislative
intention" and looked instead for more subtle indications of legislative intention, it is
submitted that the search would have been more meaningful, Had the court proceeded from the assumption that the statutory language was ambiguous, it is submitted that it may have discovered some of the subtle indications of legislative intent
discussed herein.
For a discussion of this aspect of the Third Circuit's analysis, see note 94 supra.
99. 444 U.S. 460, 466 (1980). For a discussion of Hatz/achh, see notes 61-64 and
accompanying text supra.
100. It is submitted that the suggested analysis would provide a more concrete
basis of support for its holding than the reliance on the "clear language" of an ambiguous statute.
101. It is suggested that in attempting to resolve the conflict, the Supreme Court
weigh the interest of the private citizens having a right to recover damages for property negligently damaged while in the custody of Customs officials against the government's interest in having its Customs employees conducting their duties
energetically without being inhibited by the threat of a law suit.
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